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Korea’s Reconciliation with Adversaries
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Abstract
Security and political issues over the Taiwan Strait and the 
Korean Peninsula remain as flashpoints in East Asia since WWII. 
In the aftermath of the Cold War, these two cases share certain 
similarities: each government wishes to maintain a relatively 
stable relationship with its adversary, namely, China and North 
Korea, despite ideological differences. Research in International 
Relations (IR) has shed light on how certain rivals gradually 
reconciled with each other throughout history. Rapprochement 
makes conflict unlikely between two foes. In the case of Tai-
wan and mainland China relations, economic interdependence 
and positive political and societal interactions contributed 
to rapprochement between the two under the Ma Ying-jeou 
administration, while North Korea continued to threaten the 
existence of South Korea in the Lee Myung-bak era despite the 
latter’s provision of economic assistance.
The authors argue that economic interdependence, together 
with negotiations and the political will of top leaders to pursue 
peace and stability, create a virtuous circle across the Taiwan 
Strait. This research further explores whether these conditions 
exist in inter-Korean relations.
With identification of the conditions under which peace was 
maintained through these years, this comparative study pro-
vides policy suggestions for not only Korea and Taiwan, but also 
for the United States. Trustpolitik, as proposed by President 
Park Geun-hye, seems to be the right direction in which region-
al stability is more likely to occur on the Korean Peninsula, due 
to its emphasis on nurturing goodwill with the North. This com-
parative study also provides lessons learnt from each other.
Key words: Cross-Strait Relations, Inter-Korean Relations, Trust-
politik, Rapprochement, Economic Interdependence
1. Introduction
Security and political issues over the Taiwan Strait and the 
Korean Peninsula remain as flashpoints in East Asia since WWII. 
In the aftermath of the Cold War, these two cases share certain 
similarities: each government wishes to maintain a relatively stable 
relationship with its adversary, namely, China and North Korea, 
despite ideological differences. This paper aims to explore and 
compare how the policy choices adopted by the two governments 
contributed to regional peace and stability, or the lack thereof. 
Research in International Relations (IR) has shed light on how 
certain rivals gradually reconciled with each other throughout 
history. The conception of rapprochement, defined as a process 
to reestablish cordial relations between two previously hostile 
countries, is central to this research. Rapprochement makes 
conflict unlikely between two foes. In the case of Taiwan and 
mainland China relations, economic interdependence and positive 
political and societal interactions contributed to rapprochement 
between the two under the Ma Ying-jeou administration, while 
North Korea continued to threaten the existence of South Korea 
in the Lee Myung-bak era despite the latter’s provision of econo-
mic assistance. In other words, globalization and trust worked 
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together to achieve rapprochement across the Taiwan Strait, but 
were lacking in the case of the Korean Peninsula during the period 
of time under scrutiny.
Then, what are the factors behind a seemingly virtuous circle 
between Taiwan and China, in which economic interdependence 
seems to take roots in shaping top leaders’ mindset and result in 
the absence of war since the 1990s? This is a question central to 
this research. The authors argue that economic interdependence, 
together with negotiations and the political will of top leaders 
to pursue peace and stability, create a virtuous circle across the 
Taiwan Strait. This research further explores whether these 
conditions exist in inter-Korean relations.
With identification of the conditions under which peace was 
maintained through these years, this comparative study provides 
policy suggestions for not only Korea and Taiwan, but also for 
the United States. Trustpolitik, as proposed by President Park 
Geun-hye, seems to be the right direction through which regional 
stability is more likely to occur on the Korean Peninsula, due to 
its emphasis on nurturing goodwill with the North. This strategy 
in turn may create constituencies within the authoritarian North 
Korean regime.
2. Rapprochement in Cross-Strait and  
Inter-Korean Relations
The study of war and peace has been central to IR scholarship. If a 
government believes that war is a constant in international affairs, 
then preparation for war and investment in defense seems to be 
the optimal policy choice. If peace is considered more likely to 
exist, then more trade and other economic activities are expected 
to follow.
One school of thought in IR, realism, has tended to deem war as 
the constant in world politics, and balance-of-power as a means 
that can help maintain peace. How to acquire and resort to “guns” 
rather than “butter” becomes crucial to understand and explain a 
world from a realist perspective. In other words, trade would give 
way to political antagonism between rivalries.
However, others in IR emphasize that maintaining peace despite 
war seems to be a constant in world affairs. In broader literature on 
peace research, rapprochement is defined as the reestablishment 
of bilateral relations between two rivals after a conflict. A school of 
thought in IR scholarship suggests that economic interdependence 
helps to sustain peace in the post-Cold War era.1 Economic 
interdependence, as Richard Rosecrance maintains, could help to 
foster peace among “trading states,” that usually see trading more 
profitable than invading.2 And, the increase of communication 
resulted from trade would consequently nurture mutual trust in 
their dyadic relations. Thus, “butter” seems to be the main theme 
in world politics and the leadership of any given country should 
cooperate for mutual benefits.
Scholars who side with Rosecrance seem more sanguine to 
argue that the growing trade volume has played a crucial role 
in preventing direct conflict in the dyadic relations between two 
antagonist countries and the high volume of trade has helped to 
forge a strong interest in peace.3 Though this sort of statement 
seems logically sound, many critics are suspicious of assertions 
of a causal relationship between trade and peace. While liberals 
argue that trade could lead to peace, the evidence also suggests 
that, in the face of deep trade relations with other European 
countries, Germany still engaged in WWI and WWII. In addition, 
by considering a snapshot of the level of trade relations at a single 
point in time, the causal arrow could be reversed so as to suggest 
that it is peace that leads to trade. 
Cross-Strait and inter-Korean relations provide the case in point 
to test the validity of the realist and liberal respective arguments 
about war, peace, and economic interdependence. For one, 
if realism holds true that political and security considerations 
trump economic ones, then political antagonism would precede 
economic interdependence and there should not have been 
economic interactions between mainland China and Taiwan. 
If liberals are right about the positive effect that trade leads to 
peace, then both sides of the Korean Peninsula should have been 
closer with less degree of political antagonism. Nevertheless, 
these two cases seem to provide a way of thinking that can further 
integrate the liberal and realist perspectives. In other words, these 
two paradigms are not inherently in conflict with each other, 
especially when we are conducting problem-solving research that 
aims to respond and deal with war and peace – the real world 
problem. The arguments of economic interdependence and 
societal exchanges fit in to liberal thinking, and issues regarding 
political will of leadership relate to the realist tradition. Only with 
a mutually complementary view of these two paradigms, can we 
better understand war and peace.
Most current studies adopt this complementary view to explore 
“how” to facilitate peace between two rivals. Miles Kahler and 
Scott Kastner investigated the conditions under which economic 
engagement strategies worked best to change target countries’ 
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policy behavior.4 They suggested that economic engagement 
policies are more likely to succeed in changing the target country’s 
policy when there is a broad consensus within the initiating 
country, along with the fact that the target is a democracy. In other 
words, regime type matters when economic interdependence is 
considered a tool to achieve political goals. Cross-Strait and inter-
Korean relations between 2000 and 2006 were the main focus of 
their research.
As part of the analysis of bilateral interactions, other scholars 
and analysts employ different IR theories to demonstrate how 
economic cooperation between Taiwan and mainland China has 
steadily led to peace across the Taiwan Strait, while realism seems 
to dominate, once and again, in the inter-Korean relations under 
the Lee Myung-bak administration.5 According to Hyug-baeg 
Im and Yu-jeong Choi, functionalism and neo-functionalism are 
contributing to stabilizing cross-Strait and inter-Korean relations, 
and yet constructivism in the former and realism in the latter are 
responsible for setbacks.6 In other words, the paradigm shift in top 
leaders’ mindset is a necessary condition for rivals to escape the 
security dilemma and to facilitate cooperation.
A more nuanced evaluation on Taiwan’s mainland China policy 
under Ma Ying-jeou and South Korea’s North policy under Lee 
Myung-bak advised that the two-level game theory constituted an 
indispensible part. Both countries need to deal with the regional 
context set by the United States while leaders are required to 
respond to domestic challenges from opposition parties.7 Steve 
Chan and his colleagues put greater emphasis on the international 
setting than domestic politics, wherein Ma’s mainland China 
policy worked to preserve peace because the U.S. preferred a 
relatively stable relationship with China, and Lee’s policy was 
highly constrained by Bush’s hostile policy toward the North. 
Nevertheless, U.S. support also helped both governments to ward 
off domestic oppositions and criticisms. 
From the aforementioned research, the relationship between 
war, peace, and economic interdependence deserves further 
exploration in considering overall cross-Strait and inter-Korean 
relations in recent years. This essay accepts the liberal assumption 
that economic interdependence can serve to change state 
preferences and to raise costs of conflict, thus potentially altering 
state behavior. However, while the liberal view adopts a snapshot 
analysis that focuses on a single point of time in which trade 
coexists with peace between two players, we argue that political 
will for cooperation as another variable may also serve to stabilize 
the current cross-Strait relations. Economic interdependence, 
along with negotiations and the political will of top leaders to 
pursue peace and stability, create a virtuous circle across the 
Taiwan Strait and may shed light on inter-Korean relations.
3. Rapprochement in Taiwan-China Relations, 1987-2012
Since late 1987, societal level interactions have contributed to 
gradually transform the cross-Strait relations. These interactions 
have two major components: trade and personal visits. Economic 
ties remain crucial to peace across the Taiwan Strait. Figure 1 
indicates the trading relationship between Taiwan and China 
from 1979 to 2012. The increase of trade volume between the 
two foes creates a common interest across the Taiwan Strait. 
When mainland China began to reform economically in late 1978, 
cross-Strait economic relations improved significantly. From 1979 
to 1987, Taiwan’s export to mainland China has increased from 
US$21.47 million to US$1,226.5 million. Total trade between 
Taiwan and China increased from US$77.76 million in 1979 to 
US$1,515.4 million in 1987. This number reached US$127.56 
billion in 2012.
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Figure 2: Visits Across the Taiwan Strait
Year
Source: Mainland Affairs Council, Summary of the Exchanges across the Taiwan Strait, 
2013.4 (http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Data/364179671.pdf, accessed 2013/6/5). 
*Taiwan’s visit to China in 1992 is not available.
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Figure 1: Cross-Strait Trade Relations, 1979-2012 
Year
Source: Data compiled from Mainland Affairs Council, Cross-Strait Economic Statistic 
Monthly (various years).
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Appendix 1: Chronology of Meetings between Taiwan and Mainland China, 1991-2013
No. Name of Meeting Date Place Subject Chief  Negotiators Results
1 1st Chen-Tang Talks Apr. 28 -May 4, 1991 Beijing Discussion of 
procedural issues 
related to cross-Strait 
joint prevention of 
maritime crime
C.V. Chen,  
Tang Shubei
Established a cross-Strait communications channel 
and exchanged opinions on relevant issues
2 2nd Chen-Tang Talks 
(Meeting on Procedural 
Issue Related to Cross-
Strait Joint Prevention of 
Maritime Crime)
Nov. 4-7, 1991 Beijing Discussion of 
procedural issues 
related to cross-Strait 
joint prevention of 
maritime crime
C.V. Chen,  
Tang Shubei
The two sides extensively exchanged views 
on cooperation areas and held substantive 
discussions on the place and time, without 
achieving concrete results
3 Koo-Wang Talks Apr. 27-29, 1993 Singapore Discussion and 
finalization of the  
four agreements to  
be signed by SEF  
and ARATS
Koo Chen-fu, 
Wang Daohan
The two sides sign four agreements: the 
Agreement on the Use and Verification of 
Certificates of Authentication Across the Taiwan 
Straits; Agreement on Matters Concerning 
Inquiry and Compensation for [Lost] Registered 
Mail Across the Taiwan Straits; Agreement on 
the System for Contacts and Meetings between 
SEF and ARATS; and Joint Agreement of the  
Koo-Wang Talks
4 1st Chiao-Tang Talks Jan. 31-Feb. 5, 1994 Beijing Discussion of how to 
implement the “Joint 
Agreement of the Koo-
Wang Talks“ and issues 
for follow up routine 
meetings
Chiao Jen-ho,  
Tang Shubei
1. The two sides issue the “joint press release by 
Mr. Chiao Jen-ho and Mr. Tang Shubei.”;  
2. “Measures on Facilitating the Entry and Exit of 
SEF and ARATS Personnel” are finalized
5 2nd Chiao-Tang Talks Aug. 4-7, 1994 Taipei Discussion of SEF and 
ARATS affairs and 
routine consultation 
issues
Chiao Jen-ho, 
Tang Shubei
The two sides issue the “joint press release on 
the SEF and ARATS Taipei Talks”
6 3rd Chiao-Tang Talks Jan. 21-28, 1995 Taipei Discussion of SEF and 
ARATS affairs, routine 
meeting issues, and 
cross-Strait exchanges
Chiao Jen-ho, 
Tang Shubei
The two sides extensively exchange views
7 Shi-Zhang Talks (Talks 
between officials in charge 
at SEF and ARATS to 
decide the agenda of the 
Koo-Wang Meeting)
Sep. 22-24, 1998 Beijing Discussion of the 
agenda for the Koo-
Wang Meeting
Shi Hwei-you, 
Zhang Jincheng
The two sides reach a decision on the agenda for 
the Koo-Wang meeting
8 Koo-Wang Meeting Oct. 14-18, 1998 Shanghai, 
Beijing
Dialogue with Wang 
Daohan, Chen Yunlin, 
Qian Qichen and  
Jiang Zemin
Koo Chen-fu, 
Wang Daohan
Consensus is reached on “strengthening 
dialogue between the two sides to promote the 
resumption of institutionalized negotiations,” 
“agreement between the two sides on 
enhancing promotion of the exchange activities 
between SEF and ARATS personnel at all levels,” 
“agreement between the two sides to actively 
provide mutual assistance in resolving cases 
involving the rights and interests of the people,” 
“inviting Mr. Wang Daohan to visit Taiwan and 
Mr. Wang’s agreement to visit Taiwan at an 
appropriate time.”
ACADEMIC PAPER SERIES
5
9 1st Chiang-Chen Meeting June 11-14, 2008 Beijing Negotiations on “cross-
Strait charter flights” 
and “allowing Chinese 
tourists to visit Taiwan”
Chiang Pin-kung, 
Chen Yunlin
1. SEF and ARATS officially restore mechanisms 
for institutionalized dialogue and negotiations. 
2. The two sides sign the “Minutes of Talks on 
Cross-Strait Charter Flights “ and “Cross-Strait 
Agreement on Travel by Mainland Residents 
to Taiwan.” 3. Arrangements are made for 
following up on the issues negotiated between 
SEF and ARATS. 4. A course is set for future 
cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation. 5. 
Dialogue and exchanges between SEF and ARATS 
are strengthened. 6. Chen Yunlin agrees to visit 
Taiwan at an appropriate time.
10 2nd Chiang-Chen Talks Nov. 7-11, 2008 Taipei Negotiations on cross-
Strait air transport, 
sea transport, postal 
services, and food 
safety
Chiang Pin-kung, 
Chen Yunlin
1. The two sides sign the “Cross-Strait Air 
Transport Agreement,” “Cross-Strait Sea 
Transport Agreement,” “Cross-Strait Postal 
Service Agreement” and “Cross-Strait Food 
Safety Agreement.” 2. The two sides reviewed 
the results and implementation situation 
of the two agreements signed last time. 3. 
Arrangements are made for following up on the 
issues negotiated between SEF and ARATS. 4. 
It further confirms the institutionalized contact 
and exchange approach between personnel of 
the two organizations.
11 3rd Chiang-Chen Talks April 25-29, 2009 Nanjing 1. Negotiations on 
cross-Strait joint crime-
fighting and mutual 
judicial assistance, 
cross-Strait financial 
cooperation, regular 
cross-Strait flights and 
allowing mainland 
investment in Taiwan. 2. 
Arrangements for issues 
that SEF and ARATS 
should actively plan and 
prepare for in the next 
phase.
Chiang Pin-kung, 
Chen Yunlin
1. The two sides signed “Agreement on Joint 
Cross-Strait Crime-Fighting and Mutual Judicial 
Assistance,” “Cross-Strait Financial Cooperation 
Agreement “ and “Supplementary Agreement on 
Cross-Strait Air Transport.” They also reached a 
consensus on matters pertaining to promoting 
mainland investment in Taiwan. 2. The two 
sides re-examined the results and progress of 
implementation of the six agreements the two 
organizations have signed since last year. 3. 
Arrangements are made for following up on the 
issues negotiated between SEF and ARATS. 4. 
SEF and ARATS further consented to promoting 
exchanges in various areas.
12 4th Chiang-Chen Talks Dec. 21-25, 2009 Taichung Negotiations on cross-
Strait cooperation 
in inspection and 
quarantine of 
agricultural products; 
avoiding double 
taxation and improving 
cooperation on tax 
operations; cooperation 
in respect of standards, 
metrology, inspection 
and accreditation; and 
cooperation in fishing 
crew affairs.
Chiang Pin-kung, 
Chen Yunlin
1. The two sides signed three agreements: 
the “Cross-Strait Agreement on Cooperation 
in Inspection and Quarantine of Agricultural 
Products”; the “Cross-Strait Agreement on 
Cooperation in Respect of Standards, Metrology, 
Inspection and Accreditation”; and the “Cross-
Strait Agreement on Cooperation in Fishing Crew 
Affairs.” 2. Re-examined the results and progress 
of implementation of the nine agreements the 
two organizations have signed since last year. 
3. Arrangements are made for following up on 
the issues negotiated between SEF and ARATS. 
4. The two organizations further consented to 
promoting exchanges in various areas.
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13 5th Chiang-Chen Talks June. 28-30, 2010 Chongqing 1. Negotiations on the 
“Cross-Strait Economic 
Cooperation Framework 
Agreement” and the 
“Cross-Strait Agreement 
on Intellectual Property 
Rights Protection and 
Cooperation”;  
2. Arrangements for  
the priority issues of 
next stage
Chiang Pin-kung, 
Chen Yunlin
1. The two sides signed two agreements: the 
“Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework 
Agreement” and the “Cross-Strait Agreement 
on Intellectual Property Rights Protection 
and Cooperation”; 2. Re-examined the results 
and progress of implementation of the 12 
agreements the two organizations have signed; 
3. Consensus reached on the priority issues  
of the next stage; 4. The two organizations  
further consented to promoting exchanges in 
various areas.
14 6th Chiang-Chen Talks Dec. 20-22, 2010 Taipei 1. Negotiations on the 
“Cross-Strait Agreement 
on Medical and Health 
Cooperation” and 
“Cross-Strait Agreement 
on Investment 
Protection”;  
2. Arrangements for  
the priority issues of 
next stage
Chiang Pin-kung, 
Chen Yunlin
1. The two sides signed the “Cross-Strait 
Agreement on Medical and Health Cooperation”; 
2. Staged consensus reached on the “Cross-
Strait Agreement on Investment Protection”; 
3. Re-examined the results and progress of 
implementation of those agreements the two 
organizations have signed; 4. Established the 
mechanism for re-examining the implementation 
of those cross-Strait agreements; 5. Consensus 
reached on the priority issues of the next stage; 
6. The two organizations further consented to 
strengthening exchanges.
15 7th Chiang-Chen Talks Oct. 19-21, 2011 Tianjin To conduct negotiations 
concerning a possible 
cross-Strait agreement 
on nuclear power 
safety cooperation, 
investment protection 
and industrial 
cooperation
Chiang Pin-kung, 
Chen Yunlin
Signed the “Cross-Strait Nuclear Power Safety 
Cooperation Agreement”
16 8th Chiang-Chen Talks Aug. 8-10, 2012 Taipei To conduct negotiations 
concerning a possible 
cross-Strait agreement 
on investment 
protection and customs 
cooperation
Chiang Pin-kung, 
Chen Yunlin
Signed the “Cross-Strait Investment Protection 
and Promotion Agreement” and the “Cross-Strait 
Customs Cooperation Agreement”
17 9th Round of Cross-Strait 
High-Level Talks
Jun. 20-22, 2013 Shanghai 1. The first meeting 
to be held between 
the two sides since 
new leaders of SEF 
and ARATS took office. 
2. Trade in Service 
agreement is the first 
free trade agreement to 
be concluded between 
the two sides on the 
basis of the Economic 
Cooperation Framework 
Agreement (ECFA) and 
the WTO’s General 
Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS).  
3. To facilitate 
negotiations on possible 
agreements on trade 
in goods and dispute 
settlement.
Lin Join-sane, 
Chen Deming
1. Signed the “Cross-Strait Trade in Services 
Agreement”; 2. A Joint Opinion on the Kinmen 
water supply issue.
*ARATS was not yet established at this time. Tang Shubei attended the talks as deputy director of the Taiwan Affairs Office under the State Council.
ACADEMIC PAPER SERIES
7
Tourism is another person-to-person interaction that contributes 
to stabilizing cross-Strait relations. Since 1988, the Taiwanese 
government has allowed Taiwanese people to visit mainland 
China for humanitarian reasons. In that single year, there were 
437,700 trips made from Taiwan to China. In the same year, 386 
trips were made from China to Taiwan, for cultural exchanges 
and humanitarian needs. Through the end of 2012, this number 
accumulated to 70,319,789 from Taiwan to China, and to 8,946,850 
from China to Taiwan, including Chinese tourists that were granted 
after 2002. The statistics regarding visits across the Taiwan Strait 
are demonstrated as Figure 2.
With trade and more people-to-people interactions, there 
emerged the need for cooperation between both governments 
across the Taiwan Strait to cope with the issues resulting from 
these interactions. As a result, the Taiwanese government 
established the Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF) to cooperate 
with its counterpart on mainland China, the Association for 
Relations across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS). To date, there are 
more than 40 rounds of meetings between SEF and ARATS, with 
the significant Koo-Wang Talks authorized by both governments. 
These meetings are symbolic and substantive, functioning as a 
platform for both sides to iron out difficulties or concerns such as 
trans-border crimes. Appendix 1 indicates 17 rounds of meetings 
conducted by heads and high-level officials of SEF and of ARATS 
from 1991 to July 2013.
These talks and negotiations on routine issues, we argue, played 
a facilitating role in locking in the positive interactions between 
both sides across the Strait. Economic interdependence increases 
the costs of waging a war against each other, and negotiations 
and talks spread the dividends to other groups in the societal 
level, which contributes to nurture constituencies favorable to a 
stable relationship between both sides (the doves). This is a crucial 
component of the mechanism of two-level games.8
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Figure 3. Taiwan’s Perception of Mainland China’s Hostility, 2002-2012 (Unit: %)
Hostility toward ROC government
Hostility toward ROC people
Survey conducted by:  (a) Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, Taipei (886-2-29387134) 
(b) Burke Marketing Research, Ltd., Taipei (886-2-25181088) 
(c) China Credit Information Service, Ltd., Taipei (886-2-87683266) 
(d) Center for Public Opinion and Election Studies, National Sun Yat-sen University, Kaohsiung (886-7-52520000) 
(e) Survey and Opinion Research Group, Dept. of Political Science, National Chung Cheng University, Chiayi (886-5-2720411) 
(f) e-Society Research Group, Taipei (886-2-27213658) 
(g) Center for Public Opinion and Public Policy, Taipei Municipal University of Education, Taipei (886-2-23113040)
Respondents: Taiwanese adults aged 20-69 accessible to telephone interviewers
Source: Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) of Republic of China (Taiwan), released April 2012, http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/24249412649.gif (accessed 2012/5/30).
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Economic interdependence and businesslike talks provide the 
incentives for rapprochement, and yet, these two factors are not 
a guarantee to peace across the Taiwan Strait. Political will of top 
leaders is the key to shaping political agendas, with support from 
doves on both sides. Nevertheless, if a political leader believes that 
his power base does not come from the doves, then it becomes 
more likely he will pursue a more hawkish policy to satisfy those 
who hold a hostile view on cross-Strait relations (the hawks).
It is important to take this component into account. Mainland China 
delivered a plan for peaceful unification in as early as 1979, and this 
plan was further formalized by Chinese Marshal Ye Jianying, the 
Chairman of the National People’s Congress, in 1981. It was dubbed 
“Ye’s Nine-Point Proposal,” in which Taiwan was able to maintain 
its social and economic system, and even military forces, if it were 
to rejoin the mainland. This proposal was in line with mainland 
China’s need for larger investment from abroad. This argument of 
political will also helps us understand why mainland China turned 
to a hawkish policy under Jiang Zeming from 1995 leading up to 
Taiwan’s first presidential election in 1996, despite the growing 
numbers in economic and societal exchanges across the Taiwan 
Strait. On the Taiwan side, Lee Teng-hui’s “two-state theory” and 
Chen Shui-bian’s “one country on each side statement” aimed to 
boost their own popularity domestically but had a negative impact 
on cross-Strait relations. In the meantime, as illustrated in Figure 
1, Taiwan has been promoting economic ties to increase its gains 
from trading with mainland China, while also hoping that more 
interactions might someday change mainland’s “at-whatever-it-
costs” mindset for unification. Mainland China is also exerting the 
economic “carrot” as leverage to raise the cost for Taiwan’s de jure 
independence. In other words, “economics first, politics later” has 
served the interests of both sides. President Lee Teng-hui’s “no 
rush, be patient” and President Chen Shui-bian’s “active opening, 
effective management” efforts, aimed at slowing down the pace 
and scope of Taiwan’s ties on trade and investment with mainland 
China, has turned out to be futile.
President Ma Ying-jeou took office in 2008, and Taiwan began to 
adopt the approach of “viable diplomacy,” in which Taiwan will 
not pursue the increase of diplomatic allies at the expense of 
national resources and of its relations with China. This approach 
demonstrated Taiwan’s unilateral accommodation to build trust 
with mainland China. The Ma administration continued efforts 
to restore mutual political trust with mainland China. With the 
statement “no unification, no independence, and no use of force” 
as the utmost guiding principle for cross-Strait relations, President 
Ma restored meetings between SEF and ARATS. President Ma 
further proposed to institutionalize cross-Strait relations with 
the signing of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement 
(ECFA) in 2010. In return, China also showed reciprocal self-
restraint not to compete with Taiwan via dollar diplomacy. Figure 
3 indicates Taiwan’s perception of China overtime.
Rapprochement seems to take roots in cross-Strait relations, as 
indicated from the above discussion. Economic interdependence, 
as manifested in China’s aim for economic development and in 
Taiwan’s need for continuous prosperity, plays a significant role 
in stabilizing this dyadic relationship. And, the political will of top 
leaders also factors into rapprochement.9
4. Rapprochement in South Korea-North Korea 
Relations, 1989-2012
South Korea, like Taiwan, needs to reconcile with its adversary for 
better economic development and other national goals. Besides, 
South Korea and Taiwan are both eager to maintain superiority in 
social and economic terms as a role model to their counterparts, 
so that they can lead the process of rapprochement.
Unlike the course in cross-Strait relations, post-Cold War inter-
Korean relations began with South and North Korea’s accession to 
the United Nations concomitantly on September 17, 1991. Both 
sides signed the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, 
and Exchanges and Cooperation in 1992. However, this seemingly 
promising rapprochement was soon challenged by North Korea’s 
nuclear gambit in the early 1990s. Under the Clinton administration, 
parties concerned reached the 1994 Agreed Framework in which 
North Korea agreed to a gradual, step-by-step approach that would 
ultimately lead to a nuclear weapons free Korean Peninsula, the 
construction of two light-water reactors (LWR) in the North, and 
normalized ties between Pyongyang and Washington.
“Economic interdependence and 
businesslike talks provide the 
incentives for rapprochement, 
and yet, these two factors are 
not a guarantee to peace across 
the Taiwan Strait.”
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Appendix 2: Chronology of Meetings between South and North Korea, 2000-2007
No. Name of Meeting Date Place Subject Chief  Negotiators Results
1 1st Inter-Korean Summit June 13-15, 2000 Pyongyang Discussion of 
unification, Inter-
Korean communication, 
family reunion
Kim Jong-il, 
Kim Dae-jung
Signed the June 15th North-South Joint Declaration
2 2nd Inter-Korean Summit Oct. 2-4, 2007 Pyongyang Reaffirmed the 
spirit of the June 15 
Joint Declaration 
and discussion on 
various issues related 
to realizing the 
advancement of South-
North relations
Kim Jong-il,  
Roh Moo-hyun
Signed Peace Declaration (eight-point agreement) 
3 1st Inter-Korean 
Ministerial Talk
July 29-31, 2000 Seoul Emphasized the great 
significance of the 
historic summit talks 
between the heads of 
South and North Korea 
and the June 15 Joint 
Declaration
Cheon Kum-jin,  
Park Jae-kyu
Joint Press Statement, including resuming the 
operations of the South-North Liaison Office  
at Panmunjeom, rehabilitating the Seoul-
Shinuiju Railway
4 2nd Inter-Korean 
Ministerial Talk
Aug. 28- Sep. 1, 2000 Pyongyang Emphasized anew 
the great significance 
of the June 15 Joint 
Declaration
Cheon Kum-jin,  
Park Jae-kyu
Joint Press Statement,  including family reunion, 
holding talks between South and North 
Korean military authorities, establishing a legal 
framework for economic cooperation
5 3rd Inter-Korean 
Ministerial Talk
Sep. 27 -30, 2000 Jeju Island Reaffirmed the points 
agreed to after the 
announcement of 
the June 15 Joint 
Declaration
Cheon Kum-jin, 
Park Jae-kyu
Joint Press Statement, including  family reunions, 
establishing a Committee for the Promotion of 
Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation, expanding 
exchange and cooperation in academic, cultural 
and athletic areas
6 4th Inter-Korean 
Ministerial Talk
Dec. 12-16, 2000 Pyongyang Assessed the projects 
undertaken during 
the last six months to 
implement the June 15 
Joint Declaration
Cheon  
Kum-jin,  
Park Jae-kyu
Joint Press Statement, including  
establishing and operating Inter-Korean 
Economic Cooperation Promotion Committee, 
cooperating in the fishing industry
7 5th Inter-Korean 
Ministerial Talk 
Sep. 15-18, 2001 Seoul Discussion of the 
family reunions and 
developing dialogue 
and cooperation 
between the two sides
Kim Ryeung-
sung, Hong 
Soon-yong
Joint Press Statement, including revitalizing Mt. 
Geumgang tourism, connecting railroads among 
the South, the North and Russia, construction of 
the Gaeseong Industrial Complex
8 6th Inter-Korean 
Ministerial Talk
Nov. 9-14, 2001 Mt. 
Kumkang
Discussion on the 
changing international 
affairs after 9/11
Kim Ryeung-
sung, Jeong 
Se-hyun
No Joint Press Release because South and 
North Korea failed to reach an agreement
9 7th Inter-Korean 
Ministerial Talk
Aug. 12-14, 2002 Seoul Confirmed the 
willingness to carry out 
faithfully the June 15 
Joint Declaration
Kim Ryeung-
sung, Jeong 
Se-hyun
Joint Press Release, including the military 
assurance measures for the reconnection of the 
inter-Korean railways and roads, family reunions, 
North Korea’s participation in the 14th Asian 
Games in Busan
10 8th Inter-Korean 
Ministerial Talk
Oct. 19-22, 2002 Pyongyang Discussion on recent 
inter-Korean relations 
and confirmed the 
basic spirit of the June 
15 Joint Declaration
Kim Ryeung-
sung, Jeong 
Se-hyun
Joint Press Release, including making common 
efforts to guarantee peace and security on the 
Korean Peninsula, construction of the Seoul-
Sinuiju and East Sea railways and roads
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11 9th Inter-Korean 
Ministerial Talk
Jan. 21-24, 2003 Seoul Exchanged each  
other’s views on the 
nuclear issues
Kim Ryeung-
sung, Jeong 
Se-hyun
Joint Press Release, including agreeing to hold 
the 10th Inter-Korean Ministerial Talks from April 
7 to 10, 2003 in Pyongyang
12 10th Inter-Korean 
Ministerial Talk
April 27-29, 2003 Pyongyang Discussed matters of 
common concern in 
connection with the 
implementation of June 
15th Joint Declaration
Kim Ryeung-
sung, Jeong 
Se-hyun
Joint Press Release, including agreeing to hold 
the 10th Inter-Korean Ministerial Talks from April 
7 to 10, 2003 in Pyongyang
13 11th Inter-Korean 
Ministerial Talk
July 9-12, 2003 Seoul Discussion on the 
issues of mutual 
concern related to the 
promotion of peace on 
the Korean Peninsula 
and of the inter-Korean 
reconciliation and 
cooperation
Kim Ryeung-
sung, Jeong 
Se-hyun
Joint Press Release, including discussing fully 
the other party’s position regarding the nuclear 
issue on the Korean Peninsula and continual 
cooperation
14 12th Inter-Korean 
Ministerial Talk
Oct. 14-17, 2003 Pyongyang Discussion on current 
issues, agreed to 
continue cooperation 
in promoting peace on 
the Korean Peninsula
Kim Ryeung-
sung, Jeong 
Se-hyun
Joint Press Release, but without specific 
agreements except setting a date for the next 
talk
15 13th Inter-Korean 
Ministerial Talk
Feb. 3-6, 2004 Seoul Discussion on the 
prosperity of the 
Korean people and 
all problems to make 
substantive progress in  
inter-Korean relations
Kim Ryeung-
sung, Jeong 
Se-hyun
Joint Press Release, including cooperating for a 
fruitful second round of the Six-Party Talks, holding  
a military authorities’ meeting, reunion of 
separated families
16 14th Inter-Korean 
Ministerial Talk
May 4-7, 2004 Pyongyang Shared the view that 
inter-Korean relations 
should be developed 
based on the basic 
spirit of the June 15 
Joint Declaration
Kwon Ho-
woong, Jeong 
Se-Hyun
Joint Press Release, but without significant 
results due to the North’s nuclear weapons
17 15th Inter-Korean 
Ministerial Talk
June 21-24, 2005 Seoul Assessed the 
accomplishments made 
over the past five years 
since the June 15 Joint 
Declaration and agreed 
to promote peace 
and prosperity on the 
Korean Peninsula
Kwon Ho-
woong, Jeong 
Dong-yong
Joint Press Release, including family reunions, 
the ultimate goal of the denuclearizing the 
Korean Peninsula, to hold the 3rd inter-Korean 
General-level Military Talks, agreed to allow 
North Korean civilian vessels to pass through the 
Jeju Strait
18 16th Inter-Korean 
Ministerial Talk
Sep. 13-16, 2005 Pyongyang Praised successful hosts 
of the June 15 National 
Unification Festival 
held in Pyongyang and 
the August 15 Grand 
National Festival held 
in Seoul
Kwon Ho-
woong, Jeong 
Dong-yong
Joint Press Statement, including agreed to give up all 
face-saving practices and to take practical measures 
to promote national reconciliation, agreed to take 
active measures to remove obstacles to economic 
cooperation and facilitate investment and exchanges 
between the two sides
19 17th Inter-Korean 
Ministerial Talk
Dec. 13-16, 2005 Jeju Island Made a positive 
assessment of 
developments in 
inter-Korean relations 
during this year which 
marked a turning point 
in the implementation 
of the June 15 Joint 
Declaration
Kwon Ho-
woong, Jeong 
Dong-yong
Joint Press Statement, including sharing a view 
that the Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of 
the Six-Party Talks should be implemented at an 
earliest possible date for the denuclearization 
of the Korean Peninsula, agreed to expand and 
develop inter-Korean economic cooperation
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20 18th Inter-Korean 
Ministerial Talk
Apr. 21-24, 2006 Pyongyang Evaluated 
accomplishments made 
since the June 15 Joint 
Declaration, agreed to 
make proactive efforts 
to advance inter-Korean 
relations to a higher level
Kwon Ho-
woong, Lee 
Jong-suk.
Joint Press Statement, including continue their 
endeavors for the denuclearization of the Korean 
Peninsula, agreed to make efforts for the national 
unity, cooperating in an economic field
21 19th Inter-Korean 
Ministerial Talk
July 11-13, 2006 Busan Discussion on missile 
launch, return to Six-
Party Talks
Kwon Ho-woong, 
Lee Jong-suk
No Joint Press Statement because South and 
North Korea failed to reach an agreement
22 20th Inter-Korean 
Ministerial Talk
Feb 27-Mar. 2, 2007 Pyongyang Shared a view that the 
two should normalize 
inter-Korean relations 
expeditiously and the 
relations ought to  
be upgraded to a 
higher level
Kwon Ho-woong, 
Lee Jae-jung
Joint Press Statement, including agreed to 
resume joint projects in the humanitarian areas 
and endeavor to practically resolve separated 
family issues, and agreed to expand and develop 
economic cooperation for common development 
and prosperity of the Korean people
23 21st Inter-Korean 
Ministerial Talk
May 29-June 1, 2007 Seoul No real practical 
discussion
Kwon Ho-woong, 
Lee Jae-jung
Joint Press Statement
Source: Ministry of National Unification of ROK, http://eng.unikorea.go.kr/CmsWeb/viewPage.req?idx=PG0000000586 (accessed 2013/10/8), and compiled by the authors.
With a relatively calm relationship between North Korea and the 
United States, President Kim Dae-jung extended an olive branch 
to the North under the name of the “Sunshine Policy” in 1998. In 
other words, the view of “doves” seemed to take root not only in 
South Korea but also in the North, with no evident opposition from 
the United States. With supporters, especially business groups 
within the South, trade volume between South and North Korea 
began to grow in the same period of time as indicated in Figure 4.
Although the trade volume is considered small compared to 
that in cross-Strait relations, many still expect that economic 
interdependence between the two Koreas would lead to peace. 
South Korea sees these trade ties as indirect economic exchanges 
in essence, no tariffs for these intra-Korean exchanges. In 
addition to economic interactions, people-to-people exchanges 
started with a relatively slow pace, partly due to the nature of 
North Korea’s authoritarian regime.
Against this backdrop, it is noteworthy that both Kim Dae-jung 
and Kim Jong-il agreed to hold a summit meeting in 2000, with 
the remarkable June 15th North-South Joint Declaration. Both 
sides agreed to have ministerial talks and military working-level 
talks, and President Kim Dae-jung received the Nobel Peace 
Prize for staging the summit. Appendix 2 indicates 23 rounds 
of meetings conducted by the heads and high-level officials of 
South and North Koreas from 2000 to 2007.
Figure 4: Volume of Inter-Korean Trade 
Year
Source: Data management (Korean Statistical Information Service Team), Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea. 
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Figure 5: Number of Visitors from South Korea to North Korea 
Year
Source: Data management (Korean Statistical Information Service Team), Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea.
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However, the U.S. labeling of North Korea as part of the “axis 
of evil” put an end to the amicable atmosphere between 
South and North Korea. Toward the end of 2002, North Korea 
had adopted a more hostile policy toward other countries, 
including missile tests and even withdrawal from the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in January 2003. While facing 
nuclear tensions, South Korea prioritized aid for peace as a 
strategy to persuade North Korea to retreat from its nuclear 
confrontation with the U.S. 
President Roh Moo-hyun assumed office in February 2003 and 
continued a “politics first, economics later” policy. He initiated 
a more proactive South Korean role in inter-Korean relations to 
somewhat contradict Washington’s hawkish stance. This was in 
sharp contrast to the U.S. stance on the nuclear issue, to which 
North Korea even resorted to the first nuclear test in October 
2006. President Roh, under these circumstances, still initiated a 
second summit with the North in October 2007. Nevertheless, 
in spite of North Korea’s continuing provocations, conciliatory 
policies adopted by Presidents Kim and Roh were perceived as 
a failure.
President Lee Myung-bak assumed office in 2008, wherein 
inter-Korean relations were about to enter a new phase given 
the changing international environment and the political power 
shift from a liberal to a relatively conservative government. To 
respond, the Lee Myung-bak administration proposed the “Vision 
3000: Denuclearization and Openness” initiative, in which South 
Korea was willing to create an environment for the North to 
denuclearize and for both Koreas to prosper economically. 
However, North Korea’s truculent behavior made it more 
difficult, with only limited to no reciprocation. With the same 
analytical framework, inter-Korean trade started in 1989, and 
the total volume continued to grow under the Kim Dae-Jung 
and Roh Moo-Hyun years. Economic cooperation improved 
over the years, especially in the aftermath of the June 15th joint 
communiqué made in Pyongyang in 2000. The Mt. Kumkang 
sightseeing project, Gaesung industrial complex project, and 
other inter-Korean trade initiatives have significantly contributed 
to improved bilateral relations. Nevertheless, this trading 
relationship remains unidirectional, with South Korea importing 
more from North Korea.
Humanitarian concerns also play a great role in South Korea’s 
policy with the North. Reunions of separated families, abductee 
issues, and disaster relief, among others, deeply impacted Lee 
Myung-bak’s policy design vis-à-vis the North. However, North 
Korea’s launch of long range missiles in 2009, together with 
other belligerent behavior such as the 2010 Cheonan incident, 
proved once again the shiftiness of North Korea’s policy. In other 
words, trust between the two Koreas becomes an illusion. 
In this aftermath, the “Vision 3000” initiative, which contained 
the ideas of peaceful co-existence and mutual respect, gave 
way to a new peace initiative: a more comprehensive idea that 
required the North to abandon nuclear weapons as the first step 
to build mutual trust between North and South Korea. However, 
this “New Peace Initiative for the Korean Peninsula” was dead 
before too long.
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Table 1: Major Comparison on Political Issues between Cross-Strait and Inter-Korean Relations
Cross-Strait Relations Inter-Korean Relations
Reason for Separation Civil war between the Nationalists and the Communists Confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Korean War
Plan for Unification Prior to 1980, each side was devoted to the extinction of  
the other.
Since the 1980s, peaceful unification has emerged to become 
a more attractive proposal, while mainland maintains the use 
of force as the last resort.
Since 1996, most Taiwanese people prefer “status quo” 
instead of immediate unification/independence.
Prior to 1973, each side was devoted to the extinction of  
the other.
Since the 1980s, mutual non-denial.
In 1992, both sides reached the agreement for co-existence.
In 2000, both sides agreed to seek for common ground  
for unification.
Positions on International Recognition Since the late 1980s, Taiwan has pragmatically accepted  
co-existence between both sides.
Mainland China, however, has continued to see itself as  
the sole legitimate government of China and Taiwan a  
renegade province.
Both sides have accepted dual recognition since the  
late 1980s.
The concept of “one nation-state” continues and both see 
inter-Korean relations as a special relationship within the 
same nation.
Positions on International Participation Taiwan has accepted co-existence with mainland in major 
international organization since the early 1990s.
Mainland China has continued to reject this idea but begun to 
accommodate ad hoc arrangements for Taiwan’s meaningful 
participation in certain organizations since 2008. 
Both sides joined the United Nations in 1991.
Source: Compiled by the authors. 
The low intensity of the trade relationship together with the 
North’s truculent behavior, made it difficult for both sides to 
build trust over time. In regards to the economic interaction and 
incentives for both North and South Korea, however, with the 
increase of imports from North Korea, this relationship seems 
lopsidedly in favor of the latter. We argue that a third party such 
as China needs to be considered. Since China has been the largest 
trade partner for North Korea over the past ten years, North 
Korea has become less motivated to increase trade ties with the 
South. This makes it even more difficult to nurture the doves in 
the North who prefer stability on the Korean Peninsula. A lack of 
doves prevents North Korea from further economic reform.
In addition, societal integration and business negotiations 
resulting from people-to-people exchanges are less salient in 
inter-Korean relations. This lack of integration is demonstrated 
through North Korean refugees in the South. There are thousands 
of refugees living in South Korea today and they face extremely 
difficult situations due to their lack of education, severe 
competition, and some level of discrimination. Also, the cultural 
similarity between the North and South has widened, which in 
turn has made the refugees feel like outsiders. Furthermore, a 
generation of new narratives and identities is difficult to find in 
Korea as societal integration and cultural exchanges between 
the two Koreas are lacking — resulting in a vicious, not virtuous 
circle. Therefore, making stable peace through societal exchanges 
seems very unlikely for the Korean Peninsula.
Strong political will, as revealed in inter-Korean relations, is not 
a guarantee to generating peace. In other words, even though 
South Korea under Kim and Roh initiated rapprochement with 
North Korea, a “politics first, economics later” approach without 
strong economic and social ties rendered it very difficult to 
complete a virtuous circle and futile to sustain a positive inter-
Korean relationship.
5. Lessons Learned
With the above discussion on cross-Strait and inter-Korean 
relations, certain similarities can be drawn. Beyond the historical 
reasons, first and foremost, Taiwan and South Korea are taking 
the leading role for rapprochement in the dyadic relationship with 
their respective rivals. The backbone to sustain such policy is their 
strength in economy vis-a-vis mainland China and North Korea. In 
the past, Taiwan and South Korea were among the Four Tigers, and 
now the GDP per capita in each country has exceeded $20,000. 
Superiority in economic strength seems to be leading the way.
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Second, with strength in economy and as full-fledged 
democracies, both Taiwan and South Korea are willing to 
reach out to their counterparts. And yet, North Korea has not 
reciprocated to South Korea as mainland China has done with 
Taiwan, which makes it difficult to generate a virtuous circle in 
inter-Korean relations.
Third, the role of the United States is important in ensuring a 
relatively stable external environment for Taiwan and South 
Korea to pursue rapprochement with their counterparts. Though 
the U.S. does not formally ally with Taiwan, its indispensible 
role has been evident in 1995-1996 when mainland China 
exerted coercion over Taiwan and was at last deterred by the 
deployment of U.S. aircraft carriers. Both sides of the Taiwan 
Strait have become more pragmatic ever since. By the same 
token, the U.S. has assisted South Korea, its ally, in deterring 
North Korea’s truculent behaviors, although these efforts are 
often compromised by other international parties.
Having said that, differences exist in our close examination of 
these two cases. First, Taiwan and South Korea have different 
emphases in dealing with their counterparts. Taiwan adopts an 
“economics first, politics later” approach, in which economic 
interdependence comes first and helps consolidate the bilateral 
relationship across the Taiwan Strait. Also, this approach provides 
Taiwan’s leaders an opportunity to distance themselves if cross-
Strait relations do not evolve positively. As illustrated in Figures 
1 and 3, in 2004-2005 when mainland China adopted the anti-
secession law against Taiwan, most Taiwanese people perceived 
hostility against Taiwan’s government and less to the people, and 
trade and societal interactions continued to grow. 
For South Korea, a “politics first” approach does help to 
demonstrate the leadership’s resolve in forging a peaceful 
Korean Peninsula, nevertheless, it leaves little to no room for 
the South to distance itself from the North during times of 
belligerence. In other words, the “economics first” approach 
helps Taiwan’s leadership to demonstrate flexibility in dealing 
with mainland China.
Second, how their counterparts respond also differentiates Taiwan 
from South Korea. Mainland China has prioritized economic 
development as the chief national task since the late 1970s, 
therefore when Taiwan reached out to establish trade relations, 
it became less difficult for the two to reconcile politically. North 
Korea, however, has yet to demonstrate its willingness to reform 
economically and politically, which constitutes a great barrier for 
peace to take root in inter-Korean relations because no “doves” 
can voice in a repressive political regime.
Besides, Taiwan under the Ma Ying-jeou administration has been 
striving to institutionalize cross-Strait relations, with economic 
and societal interactions as the basis to continue rapprochement. 
North Korea, however, has been using interaction as a bargaining 
chip vis-a-vis South Korea. The North’s “on again, off again” 
attitude on cooperation with the South is leading inter-Korean 
relations nowhere.
Third, North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons makes 
the U.S. reluctant to support South Korea’s policy to the North, 
especially under the Kim and Roh administrations. On the contrary, 
the U.S. expresses appreciation for positive developments over 
the Taiwan Strait and thus helps the Ma administration in Taiwan 
to pursue an institutionalized relationship with mainland China.
Economic interdependence, societal interactions with business-
like negotiations, and the political will of top leaders to push 
relations forward, constitute a virtuous circle for peace across 
the Taiwan Strait. For inter-Korean relations to evolve peacefully, 
it is important for the South to revise its previous “politics first” 
approach to an “economics first, politics later” approach. Also, 
for Taiwan to further institutionalize its relations with mainland 
China, it should reconsider the political differences over the 
Taiwan Strait. As opposed to the two Koreas’ pursuit of a unified 
Korean Peninsula, how to cope with mainland China over political 
issues in which China maintains a relatively rigid “one China” 
principle becomes a paramount task for Taiwan. The existence 
of a virtuous circle is essential to peace over the Taiwan Strait, 
nevertheless, Taiwan should note that domestic consensus 
and international support are prerequisites to direct political 
negotiations with mainland China — an important lesson from 
inter-Korean relations.
6. Conclusion
For the time being, cross-Strait relations seem to continue the 
path for stability, and a virtuous circle composed of economic 
interdependence, business-like negotiations, and political will 
between two rivalries is taking root in Taiwan-mainland China 
relations. This virtuous circle has not yet emerged in inter-
Korean relations.
In 2013, President Park Geun-hye declared that she would 
pursue a relatively modest but pragmatic course to cope with 
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North Korea. With the concept of trustpolitik, Park Geun-
hye aims to reach out to North Korea with economic aid and 
cultural contacts and expects goodwill in return. This approach, 
according to Park, is essential to gradually reshape North Korea’s 
truculent behavior for the past decades and to ensure peace and 
prosperity in East Asia. The goal of this approach is twofold: on 
the one hand, it aims to re-establish economic and cultural ties 
in exchange for more responsible behavior from North Korea; 
on the other hand, it can sustain, if not help, President Park’s 
popularity domestically by punishing the North if the latter 
decides not to cooperate. “To ensure stability,” Madame Park 
contended, this approach “should be applied consistently from 
issue to issue based on verifiable actions.” In other words, South 
Korea and the international community will closely monitor 
North Korea’s conduct to make sure it is well intended, and then 
provide a reward accordingly.
This paper argues that economic interdependence, followed 
by societal exchanges and business-like negotiations between 
two rival governments, constitute a necessary condition for 
rapprochement. Nevertheless, the “doves” as a constituency 
can give support for political leaders to further stabilize the 
relationship. From the experience of cross-Strait relations, South 
Korea may need to make a policy shift. Step-by-step economic 
and societal exchanges are the foundation, and lower-level 
official talks might help to generate consensus and to create a 
larger constituency in both South and North Korea to prioritize 
stability. From inter-Korean relations, Taiwan shall be advised 
that in lack of domestic and international support, it would be 
premature for high-level talks or summit meetings across the 
Taiwan Strait.
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